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Happiness for the people is like flowers. 
The people and the Party shall create  
the proper environment for the flowers to grow. 
(Wang Yang 2011) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Billboard ‘One world—One dream.’ Beijing, 2007 © Maurizio Marinelli 
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Preface 
One evening in August 2007, Chinese artist Zhang Dali ????was riding his bicycle 
back home. When he reached the fourth ring road east he saw a mega-billboard with the 
slogan Tongyi ge shijie tongyi ge mengxian ????? ?????. This Chinese 
language image-word is usually translated as ‘One world—One dream.’ However, if 
one respects the etymology, it should be translated as: ‘Same world—Same dream.’1 
This slogan conveys the crucial idea that China today is not only part of the world, but 
is also assertively positioning itself as a leading global player in the twenty-first century.  
 
Zhang Dali pondered upon the deeper content of this slogan and found it ‘absolutely 
shocking’ (juedui zhenhan ????). The slogan helped Zhang realise that the imminent 
opening of the Olympic Games’ mega-event (8–22 August 2008) offered the best 
possible opportunity for the Chinese State to exhibit to the whole world both its 
economic achievements and the political strength of the Party. At the same time, besides 
acknowledging the Chinese State’s strategic intention to use the Beijing Olympics as a 
public relations opportunity, Zhang Dali’s ‘shock’ also derived from his recognition of 
the use of traditional revolutionary-style mobilisation tactics. This twofold shocking 
experience led Zhang Dali to conclude that, if one compared the incredible 
transformation of the economic productive structure with what had happened in the 
world of ideas (sixiang ??),2 the mode of thinking of the government (zhengfu de 
siwei ????维) had not significantly changed. According to the artist, although the 
Chinese government in 2007 was organising the Olympic Games, the techniques to coin 
the present slogans and the realm of ideas from the revolutionary era onwards had 
remained mostly unchanged. The sameness concealed by the slogan was exactly this: 
the same ideology had pervasively persisted (jiu shi tongyi sixiang ??????).  
 
This article will begin with an analysis of the political context in which the Beijing 
Olympics were conceptualised. This will shed light on their rationale, and provide a full 
understanding of the Government-created logocentric model to hail the mega-event and 
proclaim China’s success story. The analysis of the official slogans in the first part of 
the article will provide the necessary background to investigate the origin of Zhang 
                                                
1 The slogan echoes the typical expression: xiang tongyi mubiao qianjin ???????, which literally 
means ‘to advance towards the same goal.’  
2 Personal interview with the artist, July 2011. In Chinese, sixiang ?? refers also to ideology, and 
therefore to the realm of political thought and political awareness. 
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Dali’s artwork entitled ‘The Slogan Series.’ The artist is particularly interested in 
exploring ‘the real society (shehui xianshi ????).’ His denunciation of the violence 
of the Olympics hegemonic language, led him to appropriate the official slogans to 
create thought-provoking text-images, with the aim of preventing collective amnesia. 
The analysis of Zhang’s work will reveal the aesthetics and socio-political implications 
of his artworks, which originate from his dual intention to problematise what happened 
to the ‘real society’ in the city where he lives and, at the same time, to bridge the gap 
between art and ‘real’ space, asserting the right to a new language to inhabit the city. 
 
 
Figure 2: Billboard ‘Welcome the Olympic Games—Stress civilisation—Establish new habits.’  
Beijing, 2008 © Maurizio Marinelli 
 
The Olympics: Dream of a strong nation 
From the Summer of 2007 to the Summer of 2008, the streets of Beijing were covered 
with billboards spreading slogans hailing the imminent Olympic Games. One of the 
most popular slogans used during the civic political campaign to promote the Olympics 
was: ‘Welcome the Olympic Games—Stress civilisation—Establish new habits’ (ying 
aoyun, jiang wenming, shu xinfeng ???????????). This tripartite motto was 
meant to have a precise performative effect: the Chinese government expected from its 
citizens absolute and unflinching support for the Olympics (Landsberger, Kloet, & 
Chong 2010; Brady 2009). The ‘Games’ (in the Chinese sense of youxi ??) were 
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transmogrified, from the notion of skilled sportive manifestations able to create a 
spectacle for the viewers’ pleasure, to a new geopolitical Great Game—in the climactic 
sense of the Chinese word yundong ??—with the final aim of strategically asserting 
China’s primacy in the brave new world of the twenty-first century.  
 
To understand the civic political campaign for the Olympics, it is necessary to inscribe 
it within the dominant national discourse of ‘civilising the citizens.’ The starting point 
was a general idea of citizens’ subjectivity, in the Chinese sense of citizens as gongmin 
??—literally public subjects—allegedly more inclined to perceive themselves as part 
of a polity, and therefore carrying a stronger sense of ‘rules consciousness,’ as opposed 
to a single individual with a developing sense of ‘rights consciousness’ (Perry 2008). 
The strategy of promoting ‘civilised’ (wenming ??) behaviour and instilling patriotic 
education in Beijing’s citizens has been a dominant trait of the capital’s civic political 
campaigns over the last twenty years, beginning with the campaign to build a ‘socialist 
spiritual civilization’ in the 1990s (Landsberger 2004; 2005). Since 2001 the campaign 
changed tone and the ‘new citizenship’ campaign took gradual shape. High schools all 
over China witnessed the introduction of a new mandatory text: A New Citizenship 
Reader (Yang 2005). This new textbook incorporated notions of citizenship in 
circulation in official intellectual discourses in the previous two decades, but it also 
contrasted with previous texts in that it moved away from official ideology, morality or 
suzhi ?? (quality) to focus on civics. The new concept of citizenship embedded in the 
reader has thus encompassed more civic values, such as civility, tolerance, social trust, 
liberty, independence, democracy, the ‘rule of law’ and peaceful development, 
transmogrifying, without  totally abandoning, the ‘socialist ethics,’ particularly the 
loyalty to the CCP and love for the people and socialism.   
 
Starting from 2006–2007, the pollination of the Olympics’ seeds of patriotic euphoria 
and national rejuvenation moved one step further: the propaganda apparatus integrated 
and incorporated all the key elements of the slogans that had been used in the previous 
historical periods, including the attempt to resurrect the fervour of the revolutionary era, 
and employing both vertical and horizontal propaganda techniques (Brady 2007). 
During the 2008 coming out party of the Chinese State on the global stage, previous 
slogans were reinvented and became part of a thorough and all-encompassing strategy 
to produce the ‘new (civilised) citizen.’ The litmus test for the new citizen’s proper 
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behaviour automatically became the demonstration of an organic and absolute support 
for the government-led mega-events: this required the enthusiastic upholding of the 
underlying political rhetoric tropes, aimed at projecting images of ‘China’s peaceful 
rise’ (zhongguo heping jueqi ??????) and the alleged construction of a 
‘harmonious society’ (goujian hexie shehui ??????). As Geremie Barmé has 
poignantly argued, China used the Beijing Olympics as an opportunity ‘to tell its story 
to the world’ (2009: 64). At the same time, the Olympics presented an opportunity for 
the Chinese government to operate a selective re-elaboration of the country’s history, 
and tell its own success story to its public subjects (gongmin ??). This was 
demonstrated by the Olympics’ opening ceremony, which obliterated any reference to 
the Maoist era. The Olympics Great Game capitalised on the branding of the built 
environment, and the Chinese State imposed its carefully constructed patriotic-civilising 
language onto the cityscape. Those arriving at the Customs checkpoint of the new 
Beijing Capital International Airport Terminal 3,3 were greeted by a gigantic, red-hot 
Great Wall image, accompanied by the words ‘Welcome to Beijing!’ (Huanying dao 
Beijing ?????). From the airport to the city centre, omnipresent images of the 
Olympic mascots (fuwa ??),4 commodified in every shape and form, incessantly and 
obsessively repeated the slogan: ‘New Beijing, Great Olympics’ (Xin Beijing, xin aoyun 
????????).5  
 
Beijing’s urban space was elected as the showcase of a success story of the whole 
nation, which was proposed, imposed, and exposed by means of a revolutionary-style 
slogan-like political language, covering images of highrise buildings on large billboards. 
                                                
3 Terminal 3 was opened in March 2008, with an investment of US$4.6 billion and the ‘collateral damage’ of the 
forced relocation of ten thousand villagers. It embodies a numeric message of international competition: built in 
record time (only three and a half years) using 50,000 workers, half a million tonnes of steel and two million tonnes 
of concrete, Terminal 3 extends for almost three kilometres. It is often compared to Heathrow’s Terminal 5 
(completed around the same time), but it is six times larger. 
4 Fuwa ?? are the friendlies or good luck dolls, whose names are repeated syllables: Beibei ??, Jingjing ??, 
Huanhuan ??, Yingying ??, and Nini 妮妮. Through the mechanism of Chinese characters’ combination, they 
create the phrase ‘Beijing welcomes you’ (Beijing huanying ni ?????). They are easy to memorize and mimic 
small children’s nicknames. They ‘carry a message of friendship and peace—and blessings from China—to children 
all over the world,’ and ‘also embody the natural characteristics of four of China's most popular animals—the Fish, 
the Panda, the Tibetan Antelope, the Swallow—and the Olympic Flame’ 
(http://en.beijing2008.com/37/03/column211990337.shtml). A 100-episodes Olympic–themed cartoon series 
featuring the Fuwa (‘The Fuwa Olympic Cruise’ Fuwa Aoyun manyouji ???????) was released in China on 
August 8, 2007.  
5 The literal translation of this slogan in English should have been ‘New Beijing, New Olympics.’ However, the 
decision to translate it using ‘Great Olympics’ instead derived from the Chinese state’s perception that the foreign 
readers might have misinterpreted the use of ‘New Olympics’ as alluding to the fact that the Olympics needed to be 
‘renewed.’ ‘New Beijing, Great Olympics’ also became the title of a travelling exhibition, which opened in Sydney in 
April 2006 and reached Berlin in September 2007. 
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Figure 3: The Olympic mascots (fuwa ??). Beijing, 2008 © Maurizio Marinelli. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Billboard hailing the ‘humanistic’ Olympics and the construction  
of a ‘civilised’ Chaoyang district in Beijing. Beijing, 2008 © Maurizio Marinelli 
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This strategy originated also from the CCP’s hubristic pride of telling its own story of 
the world: this was the master narrative of Great Nations that had been carefully 
rewritten and tactfully ‘harmonised.’ The popular television series Daguo jueqi ???? 
(The Rise of Great Nations), which was shown on China’s state network CCTV across 
twelve episodes on 13–24 November 2006, was crucial to this strategy. Moving away 
from the previous emphasis on the condemnation of the ‘imperialist sin’ of the past, 
when the foreign powers aimed at ‘getting rich from the blood of others,’ the argument 
of the TV series was a more positive appraisal of national experiences, in an attempt to 
represent the ‘imperialist sin’ of the past as a driving force and a sine qua non for the 
rise of the ‘Great nations’ to global status (CCTV 2006, 2007). 
 
The Olympics primarily intended to promote a unified image of national identity. To 
this aim, the government utilised a marketing campaign of ‘en-worldment’ (Terkenli 
2002): the creation of an urban landscape simultaneously ‘encompassing multiple 
worlds,’ in harmony with the Olympics’ main slogan ‘One world, one dream’—even 
though the ‘outside’ worlds were mostly limited to the branded iconic venues created 
for the Games and the international audience was carefully scrutinised and selected. 
This spectacle was produced in line with the national master narrative of ‘linking up 
with the international track’ (yu guoji jiegui ?????) (Wang 2007: 1–23). The final 
aim was to emphasise how China, which had been ‘excluded’ from the world stage for 
so long, had finally rejoined the world and self-consciously intended to reposition itself, 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century, at the centre of the global stage (Wang 2003, 
2009).  The Olympics claimed to demonstrate that the dream of the strong nation 
(qiangguomeng ???) (Li 2006) had finally come true, as a sort of self-fulfilling 
prophecy embodied in Beijing’s spectacle. The image of the ‘strong China’ was based 
on the following syllogism: since the eyes of the world were now focused on Beijing–
China, ergo China had finally regained its well-deserved centrality.  However, the 
China at the ‘centre of the world,’ the China that wanted to attract the international 
viewers’ gaze and be marveled at, paradoxically embodied the alter ego of a previously 
well-established, and at least debatable, teleology of modernity that had been proposed 
and imposed by the Western powers in China’s colonial entrepôts in the nineteenth 
century. The China exposed, imposed and proposed to the rest of the world today seems 
to have appropriated specific discourses of power and space, which belonged to the 
West. In the urban settings, these discourses have been articulated through radical 
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transformative practices, leading to the deliberate murder of home with physical and 
psychological implications. The terms coined by Porteous and Smith (Porteous and 
Smith 2001: 10–23), ‘domicide’ (the destruction of home) and ‘memoricide’ (the 
destruction of historical memory), are particularly suitable to describe what became the 
norm in urban China’s bio-politics of socio-spatial transformation, reflecting hegemonic 
narratives of progress, rationality, efficiency, forwardness, and globalising ‘newness’ 
that are not new.  
 
Against this background, a discussion on the form and content of State propaganda and 
art, at the time when the capital Beijing became the Olympics’ city, requires a particular 
attention to the ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre 1995). David Harvey poignantly interprets 
Lefebvre’s call for ‘a transformed and renewed access to urban life’ (Lefebvre 1995: 
158) adding: ‘The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban 
resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a 
common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends 
upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanisation. The 
freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the 
most precious yet most neglected of our human rights’ (Harvey 2008: 23). In the 
Chinese context, the discussion of the ‘right to change ourselves by changing the city’ 
has to start with an investigation of the politics that produce and frame the official 
image of the city. 
 
The hegemonic language of the Olympics 
In his work Painting the City Red, Yomi Braester explores the shift in visual practices 
that accompanied urban material transformation. He uses the concept of urban contract 
‘to draw attention to a particular power structure’ and to investigate ‘the complex 
networks and collaborations’ that seem to make possible the creation of ‘better cities to 
engineer better citizens’ (Braester 2010: 6).6 I argue that language has played a crucial 
role in this process. During the political campaign for the promotion of the Olympics, 
the size of the Chinese characters composing the slogans varied considerably, but in all 
cases the large characters played the dominant role in the billboards, being uncannily 
juxtaposed to the rendering of a ‘modernising’ urban landscape that was visible 
underneath the characters.  
                                                
6 Braester dedicates particular attention to the ‘cinema’s mediation between different visions of the city.’ 
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The cityscape’s images belonged to Beijing, although some of them could have also 
been drawn from other generically globalising Chinese metropolises. Fragments of 
high-rise buildings appeared and disappeared, partially concealed by the characters. In 
terms of scale, the dimension of the characters, and their relevant visual effect, was 
overwhelming. 
 
 
Figure 5: Split billboard juxtaposed to a gate outside a development site.  
Beijing, 2008 © Maurizio Marinelli. 
 
Ultimately, the subject of the campaign was always one and the same: Beijing, the city-
stage of the 2008 Olympics was the centre stage of national politics. Government power 
produces reality through ‘rituals of truth,’ which create specific systems of ‘knowledge’ 
(Foucault 1991: 102; 2004; 2007). Beijing became the symbol par excellence of the 
glorious global destiny of the Chinese nation that, with the Olympics, had finally 
become an axiomatic ‘reality.’ The omnipresent slogans asserted that Beijing 
‘welcomed you,’ and the five Olympic mascots repeated this message in unison. In this 
context, the citizens became part of the normalising force: they both had to internalise 
the myths, which represented the source of power, and, simultaneously, they were 
subject to mechanisms of surveillance and reinforcement, which aimed at conforming 
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their behavioural patterns to the explicit and implicit rules of the grand design of the 
State. 
 
Some slogans sang the praise of the ‘first class,’ the ‘civilised’ and ‘Green Olympics,’ 
others referred to the ‘Hi-tech Olympics,’ while others emphasised the ‘People's 
Olympics.’ Starting from a year before the mega–event, the official version claimed 
that: ‘Celebrating the Games in Beijing in 2008 will afford a unique opportunity to 
inspire and educate a new generation of Chinese youth with the Olympic values, and to 
promote the Olympic spirit and the cause of sport in China and the world.’7 The 
Olympian dream-come-true was portrayed ‘as a catalyst for exchange and harmony 
between various cultures and peoples.’8 Across the major intersections and at metro 
stations, the sensory perception of citizens and visitors alike was bombarded by posters, 
banners, and giant billboards advertising the ‘Civilised Olympics’ (wenming aoyun ??
??). The medium conveyed the message of civilised, and ultimately docile, citizens as 
the sine qua non for the success of the political campaign of the Olympics and, more 
specifically, required these subjects to sustain, both domestically and internationally, the 
projective positive image of the nation, which was functional to reassert the legitimacy 
of the CCP.  
 
Starting from 16 March 2007, a so-called non-profit commercial was continuously 
broadcast on Beijing Television, showing a schoolgirl who explained in an innocent but 
proud tone the sea change that occurred in her family after the International Olympic 
Committee’s historic decision: ‘My dad is a taxi driver and he is learning English to 
serve the foreign passengers when Olympics come. My mum is smiling to every 
customer visiting her counter at the shopping mall. And my granny is making pieces of 
Olympics craftwork at home!’9 Beijing’s taxi drivers were expected not only to learn 
English, but also to abide by the three crucial civilising maxims: ‘Brush your teeth often. 
Bathe regularly. Change your clothes.’ The elimination of foul-smelling cabs was part 
of the sanitising and civilising campaign (Cho 2007).  On the official website, the 
President of the Beijing Organising Committee for the Olympics (BOCOG) Liu Qi 
declared: ‘It is crucial that the public should strive to desert all uncivilised behaviour, 
                                                
7 See the official vision of the Olympics at: http://61.135.180.163/eolympic/xay/xay_index.htm (Accessed 20 October 
2011). 
8 See: http://61.135.180.163/eolympic/xay/xay_index.htm (Accessed 20 October 2011). 
9 Blog dated 16 March 2007: http://www.blognow.com.au/beijingsexyfish/55017/Olympic Wenming.html (Accessed 
20 October 20011). 
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and work vigorously toward creating a civilised and harmonious society to host a 
successful Olympic games.’10  
 
Following the eruption of violent street protests in Tibet on 14 March 2008, which 
coincided with the 49th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising of 1959, more ‘civilising’ 
slogans were coined. In April 2008, omnipresent red banners associated the Olympics 
with the patriotic slogan to oppose any Tibetan claim to independence, while at the 
same time boycotting French goods (ying ouyun, fan zangdu, dizhi fahuo ??????
??????). The internal structure of this slogan, which consists of 3 + 3 + 4 
characters, is quite unique: the final four characters reveal the real aim, but they do so in 
an asymmetric and asynchronous way, unveiling both the problematic coinage and, 
ultimately, its less civic and more political overtone.  
 
The fundamental binding element of all these slogans was the primary relevance of 
‘Welcoming the Olympic Games (ying aoyun ???),’ which essentially meant 
upholding the success story of the nation. The ultimate requirement for the expression 
of a correct and civilised behaviour was the full embracement of the ‘Olympic spirit.’ 
The juxtaposition between this particular kind of language, which was indicative of a 
precise governmentality discourse, and Beijing’s cityscape was strikingly apparent, and 
did not go unnoticed by Chinese artist Zhang Dali. 
 
The origin of Zhang Dali’s ‘Slogan Series’ 
In his artwork called ‘The Slogan Series,’ Zhang Dali uses juxtaposition in a unique 
way, creating in the viewer a twofold effect: a sense of aesthetic hyperbole and 
emotional-psychological claustrophobia. In some ways, this reaction is a projection of 
the artist’s response itself to the paradoxes of the civic political campaign to promote 
‘the Olympic spirit’ via civilising the citizens. From that evening in August 2007, when 
Zhang reflected on the ‘Same world—Same dream’ slogan that he saw on the fourth 
ring road, the artist started taking more and more photographs of civic political slogans. 
He selected the following slogans from the myriad that were plastered on large 
billboards in the streets of Beijing in 2007 and 2008:  
 
‘Effortlessly build up a saving society. Implement a sustainable development.’ 
 
                                                
10 See: http://en.beijing2008.cn/ (Accessed 20 October 2011). 
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‘Seek the truth and be pragmatic. Open up to innovation. Promote the balanced development of the 
three cultures.’ 
 
‘Study ceremony and propriety and you will make yourself more cultivated. Behave according to 
ceremony and propriety and you will make (your) life more beautiful.’ 
 
‘Enhance an advanced culture. Promote the social development.’ 
 
‘Take to heart the study, the implementation, and the fulfilment of the spirit of the Party’s 
Seventeenth Congress. Push forward the construction of the harmonious socialist society.’ 
 
‘Strengthen the construction of morality in the way of thinking. Elevate the cultural quality of the 
citizens.’ 
 
                 
   
Figure 6: Billboards in the streets of Beijing in 2007–2008 © Maurizio Marinelli. 
 
In Zhang’s artwork, the slogans are juxtaposed with images of human faces that are also 
deriving from photographs. The human faces are those of common people. Zhang Dali 
was buying rejected passport-size photos from photographers’ studios. These photos 
essentially carry an ephemeral connotation: they capture a moment in time that is 
markedly brief, they are meant to serve a precise function since they are meant to be 
used for passports, ID cards, etc. The ‘life’ of these photographs is metaphorically 
protracted by the photographer’s decision to keep a copy of them for a little bit longer, 
just in case the clients needed a reproduction. After a while, the photographer puts them 
all together in a plastic bag and throws them away. Zhang’s decision to purchase them, 
somehow further extends the life of these photographs. The artist buys these bags of 
mixed photographs of common people, and then selects some of them, based on the 
light, or on the position of the face. Zhang uses a technique similar to pointillism to 
provide the opportunity to these human faces to re-emerge, and not be forgotten. The 
texts are actually creating the images, since the Chinese characters, which repeat the 
Marinelli                   Civilising the Citizens 
 
 
PORTAL, vol. 9, no. 3, November 2012.  13 
civic political slogans photographed on the streets, are painted by brushstrokes in 
different tonalities of color so as to produce portraits of anonymous individuals. The 
results are highly stylised, formal portraits of nameless men and women, posing for the 
first time for the camera, and here again, unconsciously repeating that pose through the 
artwork. They seem to be looking the viewers straight in the eyes, challenging them to 
distinguish between the human images and the series of phrases that are juxtaposed with 
them. In one sense, the human faces are objectified by the slogans, now that they are 
artistically reproduced. Almost mechanically the original individuals seem to regain, but 
then actually lose their identity. They are branded by the Chinese characters: super-
signs of their State-sponsored Chineseness (zhongguoxing ???) (Yang 1998).11 This 
is a clear indication that individuals cannot escape the official civic political discourse, 
since they intrinsically belong to the Chinese State and are subject to its propaganda. 
Zhang explains: ‘People’s experiences and thoughts are formed by the world they live 
in, and the “Slogan Series” draws attention to the influence that external forces exert on 
society, and to the circumstances of people subjected to those forces’ (Zhang 2008b). 
However, Zhang’s artworks could also be interpreted as a demonstration of how the 
constative (embodied by the grammar of State propaganda) is pushed away by the 
performative (the grammar of artistic resistance), since the artist’s text-images allow the 
viewers new possibilities for seeing and speaking back. But does this offer a way out, or 
is it more a denunciation of the importance to resist the subservient acceptance of 
hegemonic language, and develop awareness to oppose collective amnesia?  
 
There is another important element in the juxtaposition of slogans and human images. If 
it is true that the artworks offer a second life to the photographs that had been taken in a 
lively moment and then discarded, once the Chinese political characters are juxtaposed 
with the portraits, the expressions of these individuals change and they look more like 
dead people. That unique moment in time of the pose in the photographer’s studio, 
charged with emotions and potential beauty, is gone forever. The Chinese characters 
recreate the humans but their semblance of normality has disappeared: these human 
faces appear ghost like. By so doing, Zhang’s artwork unmasks the risk of collective 
                                                
11 Chinese poet Yang Lian, in his poignant discussion on ‘Chineseness’ emphasizes the distinction 
between two terms: the Chineseness as State (Zhongguoxing ???) and the Chineseness as language 
(Zhongwenxing ???). Zhongguoxing ??? indicates the Chinese culture as a State-sponsored 
ideology, a socio-political entity functional to the creation of a prescriptive form of ‘correct’ citizenship 
via a codified schemata of culture-language. Zhongwenxing ??? indicates the possibility to build a 
personal Chinese culture via the search for a personal language.  
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amnesia of the minds of the citizens to the techniques of governmentality that are 
embedded in the dominant political language, and are ultimately meant to produce  
‘civilised’ and ‘harmonized’ docile bodies. Zhang’s intentional juxtaposition invokes 
the necessity to reflect on the internal paradoxes that lie behind the repeated use of 
political formulations (tifa ??) (Schoenhals 1992: 6–29). He seems to invite the viewer 
to delve more deeply into the archaeology of knowledge-power (Foucault 2002) that 
characterises the campaign to ‘civilise the citizens’: with a critically inquiring mind in 
an attempt to disclose the ways in which the language of power is manufactured, 
articulated and performed according to a ‘ritual of truth.’ The relationship between the 
language and the discursive formations creates a space of order, where a system of 
knowledge is constituted, proposed and imposed. However, even dissecting Zhang’s 
 
 
Figure 7: Zhang Dali, Slogan No. A6, ‘One world—One dream,’ 180 x 200 cm, 2008 2007 © Zhang Dali.. 
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artwork, reading aloud the characters, both horizontally and vertically, does not ‘make 
sense.’ It does not allow the viewers to ‘save’ the human beings compressed behind 
them, although it partially allows them to decipher the traces, and to grasp the implicit 
rules that dominate civic political language and frame the map of the world around us. 
The scope of language is strictly related to the ‘capillary form of existence’ of political 
power. In Foucault’s words, there is a point in which power ‘reaches into the very grain 
of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, 
their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives’ (Foucault 1980: 30). This 
specific point seems to be embodied in Zhang’s ‘Slogan Series’ artwork: it is a point of 
no return. The artist elaborates on photographs to shed light on an epistemic space, and 
in this way reveals both the continuity of the language-power hegemony across time, 
and the possible discontinuities of the human condition, between past, present and 
possible future awareness. This is crucial to Zhang’s struggle against collective amnesia, 
conducted through his photography-based artwork. 
 
Text-images: The violence of language  
As Susan Sontag poignantly argued, ‘Photographs really are experience captured, and 
the camera is the ideal arm of consciousness in its acquisitive mood’ (Sontag 1977: 3–4). 
It is an act of appropriation that responds to a visual elicitation associated with a 
sensorial solicitation. Therefore, picture-taking creates a triangular relation between the 
photographer and his experience of the world ‘that feels like knowledge -and, therefore, 
like power.’ Sontag adds: ‘A photograph is not just the result of an encounter between 
an event and a photographer; picture-taking is an event in itself, and one with ever more 
peremptory rights—to interfere with, to invade, or to ignore whatever is going on’ 
(1977: 11). Picture-taking has always been an essential part of Zhang’s artistic creation, 
as demonstrated by his 1990s graffiti artwork (Marinelli 2004), and his meticulous 
study of the doctored photographs (Zhang 2006). One could argue that, for Zhang, 
photographing an event is strictly connected with his ‘sense of situation … articulated 
by the camera’s intervention’ and this is integral to his ‘ethics of seeing’ (Sontag 1977: 
3). But what is the relationship between images and texts? 
 
Michel Foucault, in his study on Magritte’s Ceci n’est pas une pipe, argued that images 
and texts are antagonistic semiotic systems (Foucault 1973). Therefore, they cannot 
coexist in a single work since one would always try to subdue the other. However, in 
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China, during the Maoist era (1949–1976), images and texts effectively coexisted, to the 
extent that the text framed the ritual of truth of a claimed reality (Apter & Saich 1994; Ji 
2004; Marinelli 2009). In Mao’s China, the slogans effectively set the boundaries of 
linguistic expression, within the framework of a skilfully constructed epistemological 
and ontological universe. In the Chinese historical tradition, the ‘correctness’ of 
language has always been considered a source of moral authority, official legitimacy 
and political stability. Political language has always had an intrinsic instrumental value, 
since language control is the most suitable way to convey and maintain the orthodox 
State ideology. Formalised language has also functioned as a powerful means to 
 
 
Figure 8: Zhang Dali, Slogan No. 6, ‘Strengthen the construction of moral thought,’ 
182 x 223 cm, 2007 © Zhang Dali. 
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standardise the range of expressiveness of the subjects. Wittgenstein argues that words 
have the power to set the limit for the ‘expression of thoughts,’ because the boundaries 
of language indicate the boundaries of one’s own world: ‘It will therefore only be in 
language that the limit can be set, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply 
be nonsense’ (Wittgenstein 1961: 5–6).  
 
In Zhang’s ‘text-images’12 something unique happens. There is indeed a sequence of 
characters that generates a text, but that text has a physical, emotional and psychological 
resonance. As noticed by Stephanie Bailey: it ‘creates a dizzying effect that evokes 
spinning, hypnotism, radars, targets, and magnetic fields’ (2011: 99). The repetition of 
the Chinese characters creates a tight and claustrophobic grid that imprisons the portrait 
of the human face. The characters cannibalise the individual’s somatic traits. The viewer 
has to engage into a physiognomic exercise to detect the human features of these 
persons and cannot be immune from their psychological discomfort.  
 
There is a strong element of violence in these paintings. Violence is a common trait to 
Zhang’s work. But here the violence of state propaganda is appropriated by the artist to 
produce quite a different message. Zhang’s artwork brings to mind Lu Xun’s image of 
‘man-eating-man’ that dominates the ending of the ‘Diary of a Madman’ (Kuangren riji 
????) (Lu Xun 1918: I, 422–33). Looking at Zhang’s large paintings showing 
human faces covered by repeated political slogans, one could say that the characters are 
eating these young men and women alive, corrupting their soul by denying any possible 
claim to prolong their existence as they originally were, and ultimately negating their 
opportunity to find a language to express their ‘right to the city.’ The artist launches his 
call to arms, perhaps hoping that somebody will hear and ‘save’ the human beings 
portrayed here from oblivion, oppressed as they are under the burden of civic political 
propaganda. Heidegger argues that ‘Language speaks man,’ in the sense that language 
pre-exists man, and man could not exist without language. The idea that language is the 
creator of human consciousness leads Heidegger to conclude that only language 
manifests the perceptible traits of things of the world (Ereignis, meaning 
‘appropriation’). Language, therefore, is the facilitator of thoughtful perception. In other 
words, language must be considered as the progenitor of thoughtful perception: the 
                                                
12 This expression is more accurate, since the most basic unit of word structure in Chinese grammar is the 
morpheme, which is the smallest combination of meaning and phonetic sound. 
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internalisation of outside reality in the mind. But when language becomes ossified, 
when formalised language is repeated ad infinitum—although emptied of any relevance 
and any resonance—language ceases to originate thoughtful perception and, in that 
sense, language ends up not speaking man, but eating man.  
 
At the same time, to continue paraphrasing Lu Xun, one could also say that Zhang’s 
work on the interplay between political language and the violence of the city, indicates 
that ‘A Road is made’ (Lu Xun 1956: I, 75; 1921: I, 485): the road here points at the 
uncanniness of a language that clearly embodies a Chinese element (Yang 1998), but 
does not express the ‘right to the city’ for the human beings that are phagocytised by it. 
The human faces seem to struggle to emerge, compressed as they are by the Chinese 
characters which obscure their somatic traits and tend to annihilate their subjectivity, by 
branding them with repeated civic political propaganda lines.  
 
From the very beginning, Zhang’s artwork carried a powerful iconoclastic connotation, 
striving to create a dialogue with the violence of urban destruction. In the year 2000, 
Zhang began the first AK-47 Series covering similar human faces with the tag of the 
Soviet assault weapon AK-47. He had used this war-signifier for the first time in the 
1990s, in ‘The Dialogue Series,’ spraying the AK-47 tag on the walls of Beijing that 
were doomed to be torn down (Marinelli 2004). He was shooting, using spray-paint and 
hammer instead of a real gun, AK-47 to represent the violence (baoli ??) of a 
community being ripped apart: ‘If I use this name, I make people think about the Third 
World, the violence of the cities, and the wild hooligan culture. That’s not what people 
want to think about in Beijing today!’ (cited in Marinelli 2004: 436). AK-47 was a 
powerful way to draw attention to the destructive violence assaulting the city of Beijing 
and their inhabitants: in Beijing, during the last twenty years, thousands of old buildings 
have been erased at a pace faster than that of wartime Berlin and London, hundreds of 
thousands of people had to be relocated, while millions of migrant workers have entered 
the city. Zhang is also exposing a dialectic war of signifier (the sound-image AK-47) 
and signified (the violence of the city and in the city), a war of style (the repeated 
slogans) and content. In his new artwork, which is often referred to as ‘The Slogan 
Series,’ Zhang seems to indicate that violence is embodied in the Chinese characters 
themselves, in a language that is omnipresent and charged with an aura of political 
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authority, associated with a claimed reality and the construction a specific ‘ritual of 
truth.’ 
 
The time/s of the city and ‘the people’  
Zhang’s painting technique allows for the human faces to emerge from the different 
tonalities of the brushstrokes of colours. Therefore, the characters somehow precede the 
images, lead up to them, but they also appear as if they were inside the images. Texts 
and images once again coexist: they are so intertwined as to become indivisible. 
Apparently, the characters conceal the human faces. Although they recreate them, they 
also make them lose their identity. But ultimately, what is lost is the sequential and 
logical meaning of these words. They become words-non-words, echoing the way in 
which the material transformation of the city generates a place-non-place, an uncanny 
universe of different truths, different spatialities and temporalities, where the individuals 
struggle to find an appropriate language to express, symbolically, their right to the city.  
 
In a personal conversation with the artist, in the Spring of 2008, Zhang Dali was 
reflecting on the multiple ways in which the Olympics’ construction projects ultimately 
revealed the multiple temporalities of China’s multiple layers of presents. First, there is 
the futuristic present, exemplified by the glittering internationally branded and awe-
inspiring Olympic Games’ venues: this temporality indicates China’s aspiration to the 
new-new and the ultra-postmodern era. However, the positionality of the branded 
venues on the same locale where other buildings previously existed is a reminder of the 
erasure from memory of the hundreds of thousands of dwellers who have been forcibly 
removed (chaiqian ?迁). This is the second layer: the present-pastness that had to be 
annihilated in the name of progress, forwardness and the claimed logic of the bio-
politics of modernity. The third layer is the present-present, which is characterised by a 
contrasting time: the rhythm of the lives of the migrant workers, who have been the real 
craftsmen of the ultra-celebrated Olympic Games’ infrastructure and the iconic 
buildings.  
 
Understanding these processes requires an investigation of the ‘currents of 
contemporaneity’: only the exploration of multiple and processual modernities will 
allow us ‘to grasp the complexities of the present’ (Smith 2008: 35). Modernity 
indicates a division of the world between the old and the new, the past and the present, 
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while contemporaneity indicates the coexistence of conditions, the coexistence of 
spatialities in the presentness of the cityscape.Walking in the streets of Beijing in the 
year before the Olympics, one could see, right next to the emerging iconic venues, 
hundreds of migrants working 24/7 shifts and sleeping only a few hours in dust-covered 
sleeping-berths, precariously assembled on the street pavements: here lived the migrants, 
and here their possible dreams took shape. Their dreams were most certainly alien to the 
Olympics’ grandeur, but here they were; partially protected by a ripped tarpaulin, but 
ultimately exposed. One might wonder if the Olympics’ civic political ‘civilising’ 
campaign had these migrants in mind. More likely, they were not even meant to be 
seen: in fact, their permits to stay in Beijing were revoked at the beginning of the 
summer of 2008 (Broudehoux 2008). But until then the migrants were everywhere: 
inside and nearby the iconic building sites, working on the train tracks of the new 
‘harmony trains (hexiehao ???)’ leading to and from Beijing Railway stations to 
some of the other six cities hosting specific Olympic events.13  
 
Beijing is a city that resists being framed. Paraphrasing Walter Benjamin, one could 
define it as a site of ruin (Benjamin 2000). Zhang’s artwork invites the viewer to see 
beyond the allegorical gaze, since the city that on the eve of the Olympics was depicted 
as the triumph of national hubris and long-standing civilisation, is also the city where 
many can experience estrangement, alienation and spatial-psychological displacement. 
Beijing has become an uncanny space. The civic political campaign is supposed to 
provide behavioural guidance to the ‘new citizens.’ Zhang defines the slogans as ‘the 
parents of the people.’ He observes that the slogans are omnipresent, from the 
government documents to the public space, with the function of ‘teaching us what we 
have to do, just like parents teach a young pupil.’ He argues that the incessant 
reproduction of slogans seems to have generated a collective anesthesia: ‘the citizens 
watch them but do not really see them.’ This is the reason why Zhang decided to 
juxtapose people with slogans. The history of Zhang’s artwork on slogans indicates a 
progressive awareness: the slogans ‘are adjacent to our bodies (zai wo shenbian ???
?),’ they fill and dominate our physical space: ‘from every point of view, they guide 
our actions (zuowei ??) and our way of thinking (siwei fangshi ????).’14 They 
                                                
13 Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Shenyang and Tianjin hosted the football competition. Qingdao hosted the 
Olympic Sailing regatta. Hong Kong hosted the equestrian events. 
14 Personal interview with the artist, July 2011. 
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often carry a stern or imperative tone, using adverbs like ‘resolutely’ (jianjue ??) or 
auxiliary verbs like ‘must, have to’ (bixu ??), or expressions such as ‘absolutely 
must.’ Zhang argues that these slogans ‘sound like a severe father who is educating his 
child who has not yet come of age (wei chengniande haizi ??????),’ to the extent 
of telling him what he has to do.15 These slogans also carry an emotive capital: they 
demystify the fear and the sense of insecurity, which derive from alienation and 
displacement, by projecting a firm image of stability and civility. They are evidence of 
the decision of the State to be seen. They are the sign of policing the public space in the 
name of ‘civility’ and, ultimately, requiring the ‘new citizens,’ exemplified by the 
70,000 Olympics’ volunteer, to sing in unison ‘we are ready’ (zhunbeihaole ????),16 
and contribute to the success of the Olympics’ spectacle. In Zhang Dali’s words: the 
slogans are meant to be ‘telling and educating us, telling the people (renmin ??) how 
we should think and how we should behave,’ as if ‘we, the people, were unable to reach 
a level of maturity (chengnian ??) … we were continuously making mistakes, our 
thoughts were naïve, we were unable to understand how to live properly.’17  
 
In this sense, Zhang’s work prefigures the main theme of the famous novel ???? 
(The Fat Years 2011) by Shanghai born, Hong Kong raised, and long term Beijing 
resident, Chan Koonchung. Chan’s political satire focuses on how hegemonic power 
can manufacture ‘reality’ and induce a feeling of sustained happiness and well being 
among its subjects (Barmé 2011).18 In a hypothetical China, in the year 2013, most of 
its citizens are happy and content, enjoying their good fortune to live in an ‘Epoch of 
prosperity,’ while having no memory of the past hardships. But there is something 
sinister in this widespread cheerfulness and complete collective amnesia. A small 
number of individuals have the feeling that something strategically premeditated took 
place: in 2009 the Chinese Leviathan decided to delete a whole month from the public 
memory to argue that the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) coincided 
with the beginning of China’s Golden Age of Ascendency. This small group of out-of-
sync, strangely ‘unhappy’ souls are determined to solve the riddle of the political 
                                                
15 Personal interview with the artist, July 2011. 
16 ‘We are ready’ was the theme song for the celebration of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games one-year 
countdown. It was sung by 100 Chinese singers in Tian’anmen Square on 8 August 2007, to exemplify 
the motto ‘I participate, I contribute, and I enjoy.’ It can be seen on Youtube: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Soxk0e9ZjKI (Accessed on 3 March 2012). 
17 Personal interview with the artist, July 2011. 
18 Barmé s special issue of China Heritage Quarterly on ‘China’s Prosperous Age’ (2011) offers the most 
complete analysis of the novel and its scope. 
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mystery that lies behind the New Prosperity Policy, and discover what happened to that 
month and why everybody else seems to be so happy. The CCP Propaganda 
Department has intentionally rewritten the past to suit its present interests and lead the 
Chinese people to believe that they now live in ‘le meilleur des mondes possibles’—
thanks also to the CCP’s semi-divine character being simultaneously omnibenevolent, 
omnipotent and omniscient.  Chan Koonchung, in an interview, reminds us of the 
famous Tang dynasty’s songstress Jiang Shu, who was able to sing two songs 
simultaneously through her mouth. This kind of super-natural ability is necessary today 
to fill what he sees as a wide ‘perception gap between the idea of China and the reality 
on the ground.’ Chan explains that the inspiration to write this novel derived from a 
poster that he saw in a post office in Beijing, with the characters Shengshi huadan (?
???) to celebrate the ‘prosperous’ 60 years of achievements of the PRC. Chan 
emphasises that the so-called ‘prosperity’ is also built on ‘the harsh exploitation of the 
farmers-workers’ and ‘repression’ (Goldkorn 2010). In the last few years, the message 
of China’s Gilded Age has been sung loud and clear by the CCP, especially with the 
2008 Beijing Olympics, with the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, and again in 2011 with 
the celebration of the Party’s ninetieth anniversary. The message is that China has 
reached a new stage of prosperity and surpassed many developed countries.  
 
The right to the city as political ideal? 
Zhang Dali’s work is characterised by a strong critical aestheticism that points in the 
direction of defending the ‘right to a language’ to inhabit the city. In his analysis of the 
‘accumulation by dispossession,’ that dominates the hegemonic liberal and neoliberal 
market logics, David Harvey engages with the global struggle on the urban question 
since ‘the metropolis is now the point of massive collision’ between the affluents’ 
colonisation of enclaves and the undeserving poor. As a way to unify the relevant crises 
that ‘repeatedly erupt around urbanization both locally and globally,’ Harvey suggests 
adopting ‘the right to the city as both a working slogan and political ideal, precisely 
because it focuses on the question of who commands the necessary connection between 
urbanization and surplus production and use’ (2008: 7). Harvey’s argument for the 
‘right to the city’ as a new and fundamental type of human right is based on his 
discernment of the fallacy of the political economic imperatives of global capitalism and, 
in the Chinese case, of ‘the hegemonic command of capital and the state’ (2008: 7).  
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In a context more connected with the aesthetic realm, but nevertheless ultimately 
committed to the search for a critical way to contrast this hegemonic command that has 
led to indiscriminate urban destruction, Zhang’s artwork can be interpreted as a ‘call to 
arms’ for ways of challenging the strategy of presenting the city as a unified whole (De 
Certeau 1984). Zhang’s powerful juxtaposition of texts and human images echoes 
Harvey’s argument, since they both claim a democratisation of the ‘right to the city.’ In 
Zhang’s case, he asserts the right of the people to break away from an ossified and 
formalised language, since this is the sine qua non to be able to express multiple 
opportunities of walking in the city. Like the Decerteausian walker at street level, 
Zhang’s portraits seem to struggle to overcome the fixity of their pose and the prepared 
look on their faces.  
 
These human beings seem to strive to break through the overwhelming sense of 
oppression imposed by the slogans, as if they intended to set themselves free, escaping 
from the imposed textual grid and advocating their right to a language that allowed them 
to move in ways that are not fully determined by the plans of the organising body 
politics. Zhang’s work concretely illustrates De Certeau’s argument that everyday life 
works by a process of encroaching on the territory of others, using the rules and 
products that already exist in that culture in a way that is influenced, but never wholly 
determined, by those rules and products. In his short but incisive artistic statement on 
‘The Slogan Painting Series,’ the artist insists on the intimate relation between all his 
artwork and ‘the real society (shehui xianshi  ????)’: ‘Reality is the spiritual force 
and the origin of my creative work’ (Zhang 2008a). The adjective ‘real’ and/or the noun 
‘reality’ appear eight times, reflecting the artist’s concern with finding a way to relate to 
the ‘real’: ‘With regard to the relation between reality and symbols, I cannot indulge in 
a fantastic world. What I have at heart is the reality: the description of reality is the 
crucial issue in all my artwork.’ In his previous work called ‘A New History,’ on the 
alteration of photography and images for political purposes, Zhang Dali had reflected on 
the layers of reality and the complicated attempts to distinguish ‘the real’ from ‘the 
fake.’ The reflection on the real takes Zhang Dali in the direction of drawing a parallel 
between his previous artwork on the war-signifier AK-47 (the tag that he had also used 
to cover human faces in his paintings made in the year 2000) and the ‘Slogan Series,’ 
concluding that ‘the slogans are now substituting the former weapon’s name’ (Zhang 
2008a).  
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Conclusion 
This article analyses the relationship between State propaganda and art, through a 
detailed study of Zhang Dali’s text-images entitled ‘The Slogan Series.’ It also sheds 
light on the artist’s relationship with the city where he lives, investigating Zhang’s 
provocative response to the State’s linguistic engineering to produce ‘civilised citizens.’ 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the history of Beijing had been re-written to annihilate the image 
of the desecrated city, covered with the bloodshed that tainted the political capital on 
June 4, 1989. Beijing was progressively recast into an international stage city. The 
newly imposed glittering image reached its climax on the eve of the 2008 Olympic 
Games. However, there was something that architecture and infrastructural projects 
could not obtain by themselves. The renegotiation of Beijing’s identity as an 
international metropolis had to be matched by the production of the ‘correct’ image of 
new citizens. These two intertwined discourses became fundamental strategic 
components of the CCP’s agenda, and have become particularly crucial to the Hu 
Jintao-Wen Jiabao regime’s articulation of the master narrative of China’s ‘Harmonious 
epoch of prosperity (hexie shengshi ????).’  
 
Beijing’s success story was initially constructed on the basis of two pillars: urban 
renewal and commercial redevelopment programmes. However, the production of space 
(Lefebvre 1991) continues to reveal that there was a gap to fill: both Beijing’s local 
residents (Beijingren ???) and the outsiders (waidiren ???) alike were not deemed 
to be the appropriate agents of this newly imagined and constructed society of spectacle 
(Debord 1967). A fundamental necessity emerged: the reinvention of Beijing and its 
urban aestheticisation as dominant components of the municipal political discourse, 
could not be separated from a systematic programme of civic political education, with 
the aim of instructing the public subjects to behave according to precise hygienic norms 
and a sanitised system of values and civility, which ultimately would have reinforced 
their patriotism. This is the reason why, on the eve of the Olympics, the three main 
components of the dominant rhetoric of Beijing as a modernised international 
metropolis progressively became: 1) beautification of the physical environment; 2) 
civilising reforms; and 3) social disciplining. 
 
Zhang Dali’s artwork originates from his dual intention to problematise what happened 
to the ‘real society’ in the city where he lives and, at the same time, to bridge the gap 
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between art and ‘real’ space. On the eve of the Olympics, Beijing’s cityscape was 
officially promoted via the spectacle of branded sport venues and iconic buildings.19 
The architecture of a city is essential to its identity: the city is a sort of museum without 
walls. Walking through the built environment every day we build the city a second time, 
so that it exists both physically around us and virtually in our memories. Therefore, the 
destruction of the dominant architecture has devastating effects on the identity of the 
place and the individuals who call it home. Zhang Dali’s previous artwork, and in 
particular ‘The Dialogue Series,’ had called the attention of the viewers to the human 
dimension of the deliberate domicide and memoricide that has occurred in Beijing. 
However, with the preparation for the celebration of the Olympics something apparently 
‘new’ happened: the Chinese government saw an opportunity to move the campaign to 
‘civilise the citizens’ to a higher level. Actually, this is not new. In the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, for example, the British colonial power in Kolkata, before 
the capital was moved to Delhi in 1911, had used the grand architecture to inspire awe 
in the natives and progressively transform them into docile bodies. In a similar fashion, 
the Chinese government used an inversionary discourse of language and power. The 
‘civilising the citizens’ campaign went hand in hand with the branded architecture of the 
Olympics. Civic political language has been used as the tactical instrument to produce a 
collective amnesia, with the aim of inspiring awe in the international arena for the 
economic triumph of China in the celebrated ‘new Asian century’ and, at the same time, 
make the domestic audience proud of China’s prosperous present-future (Chan 2011).  
 
Zhang Dali’s ‘Slogan Series’ appropriates the slogans of State propaganda, repeats them 
ad infinitum and juxtaposes them with portraits of common people. Thus, the artist 
demystifies China’s awe-inspiring story, and opens a new space to explore the 
possibility of speaking in different tongues. 
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19 On the importance of the spectacle as ‘social relation between people that is mediated by images’ as opposed to a 
mere collection of images, see Debord (1995: 12). 
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